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ORRY STEPHEN THOMAS MCDONALD: "A Level Playing Field: The Big Business
of College Sports and Recommendations for Reform"
(Under the direction of Dr. Dwight Frink)
"A Le\-el Playing Field: The Big Business of College Sports" was inspired
b} the controversies that e.xist \\'ithin collegiate sport. B>' using both primaiy and
secondar}- sources, information v\’as gathered to help shed light on the true nature of
college athletics. This infonuation was primarily of a historical or financial nature. .Ufter
close examination, it appears nearly impossible to detemiine whether or not most college
athletic programs generate substemtial revenues, although man\- uni\’ersities seem to
benefit from the indirect benefits of fielding "big-time” sports teams (increased
enrollment, increased alumni donations, economic stimulation, etc.). However, the
college athletes are left in a precarious situation. WTiile they act as the engines behind
college sports, the}- are not allow'ed to pailake in many of its benefits, and man>- struggle
to handle everyda>- expenses. Therefore, refomi that w'ould allow college athletes to
recei\’e a stipend and allow- them to pursue outside endorsements would be tenable, and
reform of this nature would make the institution of college athletics more fair and
equitable for all participants.
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Introduction
Since its inception, intercollegiate athletics has been under attack. Extra\'agant
facilities, massive profits, astronomical salaries for members of universit}' athletic
departments, shady recruiting practices, and a seemingly endless procession of scandals
involving college athletics' governing body, the National Collegiate Athletic Association,
have provided ammunition for those who believe that college sports have gotten v\ildly
out of control. There is a growing sentiment among many people that American
universities ha\'e lost their academic focus and have "sold their souls” to a legion of
commercial entities in order to engage in big business and profit from the immense
popularity of college athletics in the United States. Furthermore, this intense scrutiny has
reawakened a moral and ethical dilemma that has been latently bre^^ing for almost sixty
years; is it within the confines of morality to allow university athletic departments to
participate in highly profitable commercial activities while the engines dri\ in2 those
profits, the college athletes, receive ver>' little in return and often live in povert\?
This question has become a hot topic in both legal and ethical circles, and it will
continue until some sort of actionable reform is made in college sports to remedv the
problem. The purpose of this paper is to develop and propose such a reform in terms of a
system that fairly compensates college athletes for their contributions to the "machine” of
college sports. In order to create a fair, workable s\'stem. this paper will examine the
many factors that have led to where college sports are no^^. Chapter 1 will examine the
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history and de\'elopment of college sports in the United States in order to highlight how
college sports came to be as immensely popular and ingrained in .Ajnerican culture as
they are. Chapter 2 will discuss the NCAA and its concept of the ”student-athlete“ and
amateurism to show- how^ the NC.AA maintains its powder over the w^orld of college sport.
Chapter 3 will examine the money in college sports. That is. Chapter 3 will take a look at
who is getting how^ much money in the world of college sports, and w^ho is not getting
any money. The paper will culminate in Chapter 4, w^hich will provide some of the most
frequent arguments from several different \iewpoints used in the college sports reform
debate. After discussing these various factors, this paper will culminate with a set of
recommendations on how to provide players with more effective means of compensation
that will hopefully eliminate the controversies and h\pocrisies that plague college sports.
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Chapter 1: The Historj^ of College Sports
American colleges and umversities have become unique among the world's
institutes of higher learning in that they sponsor athletic teams that are not just
extracurricular clubs designed to supplement a student's academic experience; these
teams are separate entities that have since grown into commercial juggernauts (Clotfelter,
6). These collegiate sports teams inspire the same rabid fervor that exists among the fan
bases of professional sports franchises, both domestically and abroad. In barbershops,
country clubs, restaurants, cafes, and living rooms across the country, college sports fans
gather to discuss the recent accomplishments or failings of their favorite teams.
Oftentimes, some of the most vivid memories in people's lives are key moments in the
history of their favorite college sports team. For instance, Billy Cannon of LSU's 89-yard
punt return to beat the Ole Miss Rebels in 1959 is still referenced and discussed every
time the two teams meet for their annual game,the Magnolia Bowd. Also. W'hole
economies have grown up that revolve around college sports. Restaurants, hotels,
storeowners. and a plethora of other businesses in college towns depend on the droves of
alumni and fans that come to w^atch the local university's endless cycle of sports seasons:
football in the fall, basketball and hockey in the winter, and baseball in the spring.
Furthermore, the collective mood of a university and its fan base moves with the fortunes
of their collegiate sports teams. Gloom descends on any campus that has fallen on hard
times athletically: however, for those teams that produce victor>' consistently, their

3

university experiences increased good will, boosts in admissions applications, and
increased funding from boosters and alumni donors. In fact, some people are so deeply
and emotionally attached to their alma maters or favorite teams that they elect to be
buried in a casket bearing the team's emblem or logo.
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Thus, nearly every large American university sponsors a team in both of the socalled revenue producing sports (football and men’s basketball), and, oftentimes, the
athletic accomplishments of these sports teams overshadow the academic
accomplishments of the universities. For example, few people know that, according to
nearly every ranking service, the University of Alabama has one of the better law schools
in the country. However, nearly everyone in the United States is aware of the perpetual
dominance of the Nick Saban-led Crimson Tide football team, who recently extended its
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run of excellence by dismantling Notre Dame's squad in the BCS National Championship
game. Likewise, it would probably be news to most that Thomas Hunt Morgan, or the
“father of modem genetics.'* is a University of Kentucky alumnus, but most would likely
be able to identify Adolf Rupp as a historically great Kentucky Wildcats basketball
coach. Furthermore, as Clotfelter says:
Ask a handful of people on the street what they know about the University'
of X, and likely as not they will say that what they know best is its football
or basketball team. Its famous coaches or players will be knov^m by \’astly
more people than its president or most prominent faculty^ members.
(Clotfelter. 13)
These examples shed light on the way in which collegiate athletics ha^’e become
thoroughly engrained in the American culture, and how most Americans identify
American colleges and universities by their sports teams.
However, while most Americans identify universities by their sports teams, most
universities make no mention of excellence in athletics, or athletics in general, in their
overarching mission statements. For example, the University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill’s mission statement reads as follows:
The University of North Cai'olina at Chapel Hill, the nation's first public
university, sen-es North Carolina, the United States and the world through
teaching, research and public ser\’ice. We embrace an unwavenns
commitment to excellence as one of the world's great research
universities.
Our mission is to serve as a center for research, scholarship and creati\'ity

5

and to teach a di\'erse community of undergraduate, graduate and
professional students to become the next generation of leaders. Through
tlie efforts of our exceptional faculty and staff, and \\ith generous support
from North Carolina's citizens, we in\'est our knowledge and resources to
enhance access to learning and to foster tlie success and prosperity of each
rising generation. We also extend knowledge-based ser\’ices and other
resources of the University' to the citizens of Noith Carolina and their
institutions to enhance the quality’ of life for all people in the State.
With lux. libertas

light and liberty

as its founding principles, the

Llniversity has charted a bold course of leading change to improve society
and to help solve the world's greatest problems,(unc.edu)
It is important to note that the University' of North Carolina, which possesses one of tlie
best all-around athletic programs in the country, does not cite excellence in athletics as
one of its primary goals. In fact, athletics are seemingly ignored despite the University- of
North Carolina Tar Heels basketball team's status as the most recognized program at the
school. Similarly, the University’ of Florida, which is anotlier bastion for intercolleciate
atliletic excellence, makes no mention of athletics in its mission statement:
The University of Florida is a public, land-grant research university, one
ofthe most comprehensive in the United States and it encompasses
virtually all academic and professional disciplines. It is the largest and
oldest of Florida’s ten universities and is a member of the Association of
American Universities(AAU). Its faculty and staff are dedicated to the
common pursuit of the university-'s threefold mission; education, research

6

and senice.
Teaching-undergraduate and graduate through the doctorate-is the
fundamental purpose of the university. Research and scholarship are
integral to the education process and to expanding humankind's
understanding of the natural world, the mind and the senses. Sendee is the
university's obligation to share the benefits of its knowledge for the public
good.
These three interlocking elements span all of the university's academic
disciplines and multidisciplinary centers and represent the universit>-'s
obligation to lead and serve the needs of the nation, all of Florida's
citizens, and the public and private educational systems of Florida by
pursuing and disseminating new knowledge while building upon the past.
The University of Florida is committed to providing knowledge, benefits
and ser\dces with quality and effectiveness. It aspires to further state,
national and international achievements in support of human values and
improving the quality of life,(ufedu)
After having identified the cultural phenomenon that American colleses and
universities are more often identified by the accomplishments of their athletic
departments that have little to do with their stated academic goals, it is important to
understand some of the factors that led to the propagation and immense popularity of
collegiate sports. A m}'riad of social and en\dronmental factors led to the present day
entity of college sports, and in order to truly understand how college sports got to where
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they are toda\\ one must examine the long, complicated history of collegiate sport in
America.
I. The Rise of Sports in the United States
Sports had become popular and been recognized for their commercial potential in
the United States long before they became popular at .\merican colleges and universities.
In the pre-industrial era, sports such as boxing, rowing, and horseracing had been
lucrative ways to make money in both rural and urban America. However, as the
country^’s population exploded after the American Civil War, and as cities grew large, the
market for professional sports was developed. A growing middle class now had
expendable income and free time to spend, and for many people, sports was the outlet
they sought. Sack and Staurowsky illustrate this fact best:
In the late nineteenth centuiy^ the United States experienced rapid
industrialization, and the competitive and acquisitive value of the
marketplace began to pervade all of America's social institutions,
including its colleges and universities.(Sack & Staurowsky, 11)
Furthermore, a vast network of railroads now bound the countiy^ together, and these
railroads allowed sports teams to easily travel to areas they would not have ordinarily
gone to, which led to the creation of interregional rivalries. Early fans became
emotionally invested in their local teams, and the groundwork for the sports culture that
exists today was bom. In time, this same groundwork also allowed collegiate sports to
flourish (Sack & Staurowsky. 18-19).
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II. The Rise of Collegiate Sport
In 1852. the first inter-collegiate sporting e\'ent. a crew race between students
from Har\'ard and Yale, began the interdependence of.American universities, the sports
teams they sponsor, and non-academic commercial interests. WTiile the idea of a race
between two rival schools appears bucolic on the surface, the superintendent of the
Boston. Concord, and Montreal Railroad actually organized the event, and he made
promises of gifts and copious alcohol in order to lure wealthy spectators and alumni to
the event (Zimbalist. 6-7). This event grimly foreshadowed the insidious marriage that
would be consummated between commercial interests and collegiate sports for the next
one hundred and sixty years.
Nearly twenty years after Hars'ard rowed against Yale, on November 6, 1869.
students from what are now- Rutgers University and Princeton University engaged in the
first football game, which at the time was a loose variation on the established sport of
rugby. Shortly thereafter, and not even fifty years after that crew race between Han-ard
and Yale, all three major college sports (football, basketball, and baseball) and others,
including track and field (Zimbalist, 7), were being organized and played collegiately
(Clotfelter, 44).
From this point forward, collegiate athletics continued to grow and entrench
themselves in American culture. Marquee matchups between the most highly ranked
football teams drew huge crowds; the 1893 contest between early hea\’)'weights Yale and
Har\'ard attracted more than 50.000 fans to a field in Manhattan (Clotfelter. 44). and the
annual Princeton-Yale game drew in excess of 40.000 spectators (Zimbalist. 7).
However, these early years of intercollegiate sport were characterized b\- student
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organization. Students were largely responsible for the maintenance of these sports
teams, and they provided their o\mi coaches, uniforms, support, and other equipment
(Clotfelter. 44).
This student-led autonomy would not last long. In the midst ofthe American Civil
War, in 1864, Yale University hired a professional coach to oversee its crew program
(Clotfelter, 44). Professional coaches have been the norm ever since, but at the time, this
was a huge catalyst in starting the institution of collegiate athletics down the path towards
the present incarnation that exists today. Also, the competitiveness of these student sports
teams began to grow, and teams began to play more and more contests, which were
frequently against teams from other colleges and universities and during the school year.
Furthermore, these matches and games began to generate both expenses and
revenues from ticket sales, as well as media coverage. This development alarmed many
school administrators, and these concerned academics began to push for more control
over when their students would be off campus and how much time the students could
spend pursuing their athletic goals. As the concern over college sports spread amonsst
university executives, collegiate athletics’ status as student-run organizations became
obsolete, and universities took over the administration of their teams (Clotfelter. 45)
Administrators began to fear that a certain class of students was being created that placed
little to no priority on academics, and many school presidents took a hard stance against
the importance that sports was beginning to hold. Comments made by Charles W. Eliot.
Har\’ard‘s president from 1869 to 1909. typify the attitude expressed by many of his
peers when he said: “[the authorities at Harvard] are opposed to all money making at
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intercollegiate contests and...to all exhibitions or contests which are deliberately planned
to attract a multitude and thereby increase gate money"(Sack & Staurowsk}-, 24-25).
However, whatever concerns school administrators had for their players'
academic standards did not prevent the political and economic realities of collegiate
sport, and a huge emphasis was placed on winning. By 1880, Yale possessed a football
slush fund that had eclipsed $100,000. Also, college teams regularly used bribes and
perquisites in order to lure graduate students or non-students to play for them. Teams
would enroll a player from another school or off the street just in time to play a big game,
and then, after the game, that player would be sent back to where he came from. In 1893.
the president of Cornell College in Iowa, W.F. King, remarked sadly on this state of
affairs:
The hot competition in these games stimulates certain unfortunate
practices, such as the admission of professionals into college as nominal
students at the expense of the team, tendencies to betting, the limitation of
the benefits of the games to a very few persons, and with these the interest
is too intense to be compatible with educational advantages.(Zimbalist. 8)
Furthermore, the rise in coaches' salaries that is epidemic today began to take root
in the late 19^^ century. Coaching salaries began to balloon to amounts greater than those
of even the most handsomely compensated faculty. A study conducted in 1929 by the
Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, called American College
Athletics, found that the average football coach s salar\’ exceeded the a^’erage highly paid
professor's salary by a full 10% (Clotfelter. 47-48). Protests against this trend grew. but.
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as would happen countless times in the future, special interest groups such as alumni and
boosters thwarted any effort to curb the gro\^th of college athletics (Zimbalist, 7-8).
By the early 20^*^ centur}\ the game that is most often identified ^^ith college
sports, football, began to solidify itself as the premiere sport of collegiate athletics. Prior
to 1890, there were several versions of the game in existence, including the two most
popular, which closely resembled the modem games of soccer and mgby,respectively.
However, after 1890, the violent, savage version most closeh’ related to mgby became
the game of choice. The first intercollegiate association of northeastern universities made
an attempt to provide a universal set of mles in order to foster fair play, and modem
football consisting of a center snapping a ball to a quarterback was bom (Clotfelter, 45).
As the game began to become more entrenched in collegiate life, it also began to
collect a growing number of critics and detractors. As injuries from the violent game
mounted, even the President of the United States took notice. Many midshipmen playing
on the team representing the United States Naval Academy were unable to perform their
duties because of incapacitation from the game of football (Clotfelter, 46), and after a
fight between a rear admiral and a brigadier general at the 1893 Army-Na\7 football
game. President Grover Cleveland suspended the annual contest indefinitely..\rmy and
Navy would not play again until after President Cleveland's presidency, in 1899(Cronk).
However, this was not the end of presidential interference into college football. In
1905. a year in which eighteen players died on American collegiate football fields, and
which brought the total death toll of collegiate football since 1890 to three hundred and
thirty. President Theodore Roosevelt summoned the presidents of Harv'ard, Yale, and
Princeton to convene at the WTiite House. Prompted by the rampant bloodshed present in
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the sole domain of the rich and pri\-ileged. uni^'ersities no'A' modified their curricula to
include practical and vocational skills courses, which made college more appealinc to the
middle and lower classes and encouraged more of the business-minded public to pursue
higher education. Also, funding for these new land grant universities was rarelv
guaranteed. The Morrill Acts created colleges and universities in areas of the countr\' that
could barely afford to keep them open. Therefore, schools had to become very creative in
order to attract students and sur\’ive (Sack & Staurowsky. 191.
As more land grant universities and technical colleges joined the older.
established liberal arts schools and state universities, competition for students became
fierce. Very fe\\- schools enjoyed the financial backing and patronage of early .American
industrial tycoons such as .lohn D. Rockefeller and Leland Stanford, and so the
effectiveness of a school’s advertising and public relations departments was at a
premium. As colleges and universities became dependent on their ability to sell
themselves to the public, college sports pro\’ided a way for college administrators to link
the allure of higher education to the broader American culture. Quality college sports
teams had already demonstrated that the}' could attract large crowds of spectators, and
v\'ith the large crowds came the attention of the media. Also, businessmen, instead of the
traditional academics, increasingly ran colleges and uni^'ersities. These businessmen were
oftentimes opposed to the concept of a liberal aits education, which they associated with
weakness and feminism. To these men. football was the opposite. It was masculine and
tough, and it taught \’alues that were important in the business setting (Sack &
Staurowsky. 20-21).
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Some of the most recognizable names in modem college football, including Ohio
Stale. Auburn Uni\ ersity. Oregon State, the University of.Arkansas, Texas A&M
Universit)-. the Universit}' of California at Los Angeles, and the University of Florida.
were founded after the passage of the Morrill Acts. However, a university^ that no longer
even sponsors a college football team provides the best example of how schools used
football and other sports to increase their \’isibility' and their enrollment.
In 1892. the newl\- elected president of the University' of Chicago, William
Raine}' Harper, hired .Amos .Alonzo Stagg to coach the university^'s football team. With
football as an integral part of the newly founded University of Chicago's marketing plan
to attract students. Stagg. a former Yale football star, was told to "develop teams which
we can send around the countr>' and knock out all the colleges. We will give them a
palace car and a \’acation loo.".Apparently, Harper's strategy w^orked. Over a thirteenyear period, the University of Chicago's enrollment grew over three hundred percent,
from 1.815 students to more than 5.500. However, Stagg w'as often charged with
employing some unscrupulous practices in his pursuit of gridiron victory. Claims of an
$80,000 football slush fund, the use of professional athletes, and providing athletes with
off-campus jobs for w'hich they did no work abounded, but Stagg was never seriously
reprimanded. Instead, he became one of the highest paid members on the University' of
Chicago payroll, and on the heels of its football team's success, the University of
Chicago prospered (Sack & Staurowsky, 21-22).
The strategies employed by William Rainey Harper and the University' of Chicago
pro\'ide a shining illustration of the thought process and motivations behind sponsoring
big-time sports teams at colleges and universities, but the University of Chicago w’as
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hardh’ the only college emplo>'ing such a strategy. Many schools followed the same path
as the Unix ersity of Chicago, and as college sports became more popular and more
connected to the .American public, schools began to build large stadiums to accommodate
the crowds that wanted to watch college football betxx'een 1920 and 1940. The University
of Michigan at Ann .Arbor completed Michigan Stadium, which is fondly known as “The
Big House*' by fans, in 1927. It had a seating capacity of over 84,000 (Clotfelter. 47). In
1922, Ohio State began construction on the 66,000-seat Ohio Stadium, and in 1923, the
University of California at Berkeley built a new stadium with a capacity' of over 76.000.
Even the I\'y schools built big stadiums. Harx'ard constructed the first permanent stadium
in 1903. and Yale followed suit with a stadium built in 1914 that could hold more than
75.000 fans(Sack & Staurow'sky. 31). Astoundingly, ofthe fi%-seven schools in the five
largest athletic conferences in 2010, thirty-five had begun building new'football stadiums
in the 1920s (Clotfelter. 47).
Meanw^hile. as these huge stadiums w^ere built, huge crowds paid to fill them, and
gate receipts began to swell. At the time, before the widespread use of radios and before
the invention of television, gate receipts were the only source of revenue from college
sports, and because of its ability to fill large stadiums, football became the sport of choice
for many institutions.
The popularity of college football sun'ived the Great Depression, and after World
War II, as populations and incomes grew', so too did the popularity of college football.
Teams began to play more games every year, and, as the number of games increased, the
attendance at these games also increased. After World War II, the “modem era” of
college athletics began.
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IV. The Modern Era
Today, two very different enterprises are at work in schools that sponsor big-time
college athletics. On one side, there is the orthodox, academic enterprise that works to
spread and propagate knowledge. On the other side, there is the unorthodox world of
collegiate athletics. wWch senses as a form of mass entertainment and which has become
embedded in the American university culture, although it bears little relation to the lofty\
traditional goals of higher education. However, before one further explores the
contemporar}' world of college sports, clarification on what can be construed as "bigtime" collegiate athletics is needed. Big-time college athletics can also be called
commercial college athletics, and this term generally encompasses the sports of football
and men's basketball. The university athletic programs that qualify for big-time status are
characterized by a few universal traits. First of all, these athletic programs command
large budgets. Secondly, these programs are exposed to immense amounts of television,
radio, print, and other media exposures. Indeed, some schools and conferences now run
their own radio and television networks and ensage in contracts worth billions of dollars.
Third, these schools employ highly compensated coaches, award athletic scholarships,
and actively seek out talented high school athletes to whom to aw^ard these scholarships.
Fourth, these athletic programs all operate men's basketball teams that compete in NCAA
Division I, and many ofthem also possess football programs that compete in the NCAA
Di\'ision 1-A Football Bowl Subdivision, or FBS, wWch is the highest level of
competition. Finally, these athletic programs are akin to actual business corporations,
with high degrees of sophistication in their marketing, advertising, and human resource
departments (Clotfelter, 16-17). A summary of these traits is illustrated in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: What Makes ^'Big-Time” Big-Time?
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In short, these programs are the “biggest of the big.” These programs receive most
of the publicity; they are the dream jobs for young coaches looking to make a name for
themselves; they are at the top of every talented high school player's list; hundreds of
thousands pack their stadiums every year; and they make, and spend, the most money. In
fact, perhaps the easiest way to describe big-time college athletic programs is to look at
which ones annually spend the most money. In Table 1, the top 100 universities with the
highest annual expenditures for the fiscal year 2011 are listed in descending order.
Table 1: Top 100 Unixersities by annual expendituresfor thefiscal year 2011
Rank
1

University
Texas

Expenses($ M)
133.7

2

Ohio State

122.3

3

111.9

4

Michigan
Florida

5

Alabama

105.1

6

Penn State

101.3

7

Auburn

100.5

8

Tennessee

97.6

9

Wisconsin

95.6

107.2

18

10

Oklahoma

94.3

11

LSU

91.8

12

Iowa

88.1

13

Florida State

86.9

14

Michigan State

84

15

82.8

16

Kentucky
Nebraska

81.9

17

Louisville

81.9

18

80.8

19

Georgia
South Carolina

80.5

20

Arkansas

79.3

21

Minnesota

78.9

22

Texas A&M

78.3

23

Oregon

76.2

24

North Carolina

74.3

25

Illinois

73.4

26

72.4

27

Virginia
Kansas

28

Indiana

69.3

29

67.9

30

Washington
Oklahoma State

66.9

31

UCLA

66

32

Missouri

64.2

33

Connecticut

63

34

California

62.7

35

Virginia Tech

62,6

36

West Virginia

61.7

37

Maryland

61.6

38

Nevada- Las Vegas

60.5

39

60.2

40

Rutgers
Purdue

41

Colorado

59.2

42

Arizona

58.5

43

Clemson

58.4

44

Arizona State

57.1

72

59.4

19

45

Texas Tech

57

46

Georgia Tech

55.1

47

Oregon State

54.6

48

51.6

49

Mississippi State
North Carolina State

50

Iowa State

48.5

51

Ole Miss

47.1

52
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56
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San Diego State
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72
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24.3
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Source: USA Today
http://usatoday30.usatoday.eom/sports/college/story/2012-05-14/ncaa-college-athletics-financesdatabase/54955804'1

WTiile this list is fairly comprehensive, it is important to note the absence of many key
pri\'ate universities that would typically be labeled as big-time participants in college
athletics, such as the University of Notre Dame,the University of Southern California.
Texas Christian University, Stanford University, Duke University, Boston College,
Purdue University’, the University of Miami. Northwestern University, Baylor University,
Georgia Tech, and Georgetown University. These universities are not listed because the
NC.AA is not obligated to release their financial infonnation. However, the omissions
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While this list is fairly comprehensive, it is important to note the absence of many key
pri\'ate universities that would typically be labeled as big-time participants in college
athletics, such as the University of Notre Dame,the University of Southern California,
Texas Christian University, Stanford University. Duke University, Boston College,
Purdue University, the University of Miami. Northwestern University, Baylor Universit>-.
Georgia Tech, and Georgetown University. These universities are not listed because the
NC.AA is not obligated to release their financial infonnation. However, the omissions
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notwithstanding. Table 1 paints a clear picture of which schools are the major players in
college athletics.
As stated pre^'iously. American colleges and universities that engage in big-time
athletics are in the business of entertainment. As Clotfelter says:
Although they rarely acknowledge it, the American universities that
operate big-time commercial sports enterprises are in the entertainment
business.... To be successful in this business, a university must maintain
an enterprise that is quite different from the other, academic entity that
controls the traditional functions.... Thus two dissimilar enterprises have
come to coexist within these universities in a reluctant but necessary
symbiotic embrace, each one needing something only the other can
provide, but each one waiy of the other. (Clotfelter, 20-21)
The marriage of academe and athletics is a ver}^ curious relationship, and it is unique. The
academics, or the school administrators, want winning sports teams because the school's
stakeholders, who are the students, boosters, alumni, and fans, demand winning teams.
However, the academics are loath to subsidize athletics with educational funds. Similarly.
the athletic departments need the endorsement of the educational institutions, but since
the colleges and universities withhold subsidies, the athletic departments are forced to use
their immense commercial power to generate revenues, because without revenues, the
likelihood of winning diminishes. Furthermore, in order to generate more revenues,
athletic departments have to spend more. To remain competitive and relevant, collegiate
teams must compete with professional leagues, such as the National Football League.
National Basketball Association. Major League Baseball, and the National Hockey
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League. Similarh. the}’ must compete with the plethora of other forms of entertainment
that entice the public. Therefore, athletic departments have to ensure that their product is
the best, which means recruiting the best high school athletes. However, the best athletes
will not play for schools without top facilities or top coaches, so athletic departments
have to spend substantial amounts of money to build the best facilities and hire the best
coaches.
This scenario, which plan's out day after day in many universities across the
countr^^ places stress on both the academic and athletic facets of a university, and it
routinely tests the fragile balance that exists between these two entities. The balance of
power often tips back and forth. The growth of modem collegiate sport as entertainment.
however, is not altogether bad. Collegiate sports provide a way for the past, present, and
future generations of a university to bond together. They have also created and continue
to support countless businesses and micro economies around the country. Collegiate
sports teams are routinely the engines behind billions of dollars in economic transactions
across the nation. Furthermore, the immense publicity’ that college sports teams seek and
command can be very beneficial for universities in more wa}^s than just attracting
students. The publicity and positive recognition that comes from having good sports
teams can attract better faculty’, it can increase alumni contributions, and it can generate
positive growth for the university as a whole. College sports have also helped to make
American higher education more egalitarian. Collegiate athletics paved the way for the
multitude of schools created after the passage of the Morrill Acts to keep their doors open
and prosper. In turn, many more Americans who may not have otherwise had the
opportunit}’ to pursue a college education were able to obtain that lofty’ goal, and the
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elitism that existed in earh' American education was broken into. Lastly, sports have
direct!} pro\ ided ways for man}’ students who may not have been able to attend college
to do so through the award of an athletic scholarship.
Despite all of the positive and negative effects and aftereffects of collegiate sports
both past and present, one giant issue remains largely ignored and unresolved: the status
of the students who participate in college athletics. However, before delving into this
confusing, convoluted, and often touchy subject, one must understand the organization
that has played the biggest role in the creation of the system of college sports that affects
college athletes today, and that is the National Collegiate Athletic Association, or NC.AA..
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Chapter 2: The NCAA
In its modem incarnation, the National Collegiate Athletic Association is
composed of more than 1.200 colleges, universities, and other institutions, and it is a
voluntar}-. non-profit organization. It maintains a permanent staff and a 140,000 square
foot headquarters building on the outskirts of Indianapolis. Indiana, but its member
institutions make all of the major decisions concerning NC.AA mles and regulations
(Kreher).
Structurally, the NCAA's member institutions are subdivided into three main
classes based on their financial commitment to competition: Division I, Division II, and
Di^dsion III. Di\’ision I is reser\^ed for the highest level of competition, and it is further
di\’ided into Di^dsions I-A and I-AA (Kreher). As mentioned earlier in this paper.
Division I-A programs constitute ‘"big-time” college athletics.
Additionally, the NCAA creates and enforces a multitude of mles concerning
what is and is not permissible in college athletics. It organizes and implements
tournaments for many collegiate men’s and women’s sports, most notably the men’s
basketball championship tournament, which is commonly called “March Madness.’'
Furthermore, the NC.A4 negotiates the tele^dsion rights for its sanctioned tournaments.
and in order for an institution to receive the financial benefits generated from these
tournaments, it must be a member of the NCAA (Kreher).
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Lasth’. the NCA.A. maintains an extremely controversial code of amateurism.
Basically, this code of amateurism, or non-professionalism, restricts college athletes from
recei\'ing any compensation beyond a scholarship for their efforts as the drivers behind
the billion-dollar college athletic industry^ This amateurism code is the subject of much
scrutiny, and it is one of the primaiy' foci of this paper.
In sum. the NC.AA is an incredibly large, incredibly influential organization that
overarches almost all of collegiate athletics. Its ubiquitous presence is felt across the
nation and it touches every facet of college sports. However,the NCAA performs two
contradictor)’ roles. On one side, the NC.A.A is dedicated to the defense and propagation
of amateurism in college sports. On the other side, it serves as a cartel of universities that
has two goals: profit maximization and cost minimization. These conflicting roles,
whereby the NC.AA is dedicated to both amateurism and professionalism, are what make
the NCA.A so hard to understand. In order to more clearly understand the NCAA and its
motives and influence on modem college athletics, one must understand its history', its
concept of amateurism, and the way it functions economically.
I. Brief History of the NCAA
As briefly mentioned earlier, the precursor to the NCAA,the Intercollegiate
Athletic Association of the United States, was founded in 1905 under the scmtiny of
President Theodore Roosevelt. The creation of the organization w’as spearheaded by
Harvard, Yale, and Princeton, and they were joined by fifty-nine other colleges and
universities. This original association created and instituted a new set of rules for college
football that closely resembles the game that is played today, and the Intercollegiate
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Athletic Association of the United States was renamed the National Collegiate Athletic
Association in 1912.
While \ iolence and the large death toll associated ^^dth college football brought
the NCA.4^ into existence, the other prominent issues facing college sports, such as the
concept of amateurism and the eligibiliU' of players, were also discussed at length at the
first annual NCA.A. con^'ention in 1906. The participants understood that college sports
were growing at an alarming rate. Indeed, intercollegiate competition w'as growing faster
than the schools could manage. Fan interest was growing and collegiate sports began to
develop ri\'alries and associations that crossed traditional, regional boundaries. In order to
take ad\'antage of this immense marketing opportunity, the NCAA needed to adopt a set
of rules that w'ould provide a level playing field for all the colleges and universities
invoh ed (Sack & Staurow'sky

). This foresight on the part of the NCAA led to the

aforementioned rule changes that created the modem game of football. Also included in
the first NCAA bylaw^s were restrictions and definitions on the concept of amateurism.
Henceforth, this concept of‘‘amateurism’" needs to be discussed in conjunction with the
history of the NCAA because it is irrevocably and undeniably related to both the
existence of the NC.AA and the status of the students w^ho participate in college sports.
II. Amateurism
According to Webster's Dictionar}^ an amateur is:
1. Devotee; Admirer
2. One w'ho engages in a pursuit, study, science, or sport as a pastime rather
than as a profession
3. One lacking in experience and competence in an art or science
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(Merriam-Webster, emphasis mine)
.Ajnateurism. in its broadest sense, can be thought of as the direct opposite of
professionalism. Similarly, it is also the opposite of commercialism (Allison, 3). Not
coincidentally, these three words are the words most often used when discussing the
status of collegiate athletics and the students who participate in them..Amateurism is a
word used by the NCA.A. and its supporters to describe college sports and college
athletes. In the 2011-2012 NCA.\ manual, the NC.AA publishes a Principle of
Amateurism, w’hich it states as:
Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and their
participation should be motivated primarily by education and by the
physical, mental and social benefits to be derived. Student participation in
intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and student-athletes should be
protected from exploitation by professional and commercial enterprises.
(NCAA manual)
This espoused definition of amateurism has come under intense scrutiny from those who
recognize the decidedly professional and commercial attributes of collegiate sports. The
NCAA's definition and interpretation of amateurism has also evolved quite considerably
since the association's founding. However, what is this concept of‘‘amateurism?’ WTiat
has it been traditionally, and how does the NCAA define it today?
ILI The Early Roots ofAmateurism
Early .American amateurism had its roots across the Atlantic Ocean. British
colonists to the New World played the largest role in developing many early American
colonial customs, and these colonists’ attitudes towards the roles of sports was no
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different. The British amateur spirit was derived from the role of sports in the lives ofthe
preindustrial British aristocracv. These members of the ‘ieisure class’* had ample time
a\ ailable to them to pursue a myriad of different recreational pursuits, and these pursuits
included games and sports. However, one important facet ofthe aristocratic outlook was
that the British gentry strove to do everything well, not just one thing exceptionally. Sack
and Staurowsky illustrate this point particularly well when they sa)':
...The gentleman-aristocrat w'as not expected to put forth too great an
effort in any single direction. He could strive for excellence, but not just in
one activiw and as a consequence of prolonged training. The aristocrat
took great pains to distance himself from the highly trained professional,
the latter being \iewed as a mere “segment of a man - overdeveloped in
one direction, atrophied in all others.** Investing too much time and effort
in one specialized activit}' would be plebeian.(Sack & Staurowsky, 11-12)
The above quote perfectly embodies the purpose of sports at British colleges and
universities. Although British collegians had been engaging in sports since at least the
sixteenth century, sports were alw'ays expected to be maintained in conjunction with the
other facets of their university responsibilities, namely, their academics. However, this is
not to say that British collegiate sports were not taken seriously. In fact, they were quite
competitive. Despite the competitiveness, as Allison says:
...The cult of organized games as sport had to be essentially amateur. It
was about gentlemanliness, leisure, loyalty, and decency. It had to eschew
the vulgar gladiatorialism of the Romans in favour of the religious
athleticism of the Greeks if it were to play the moral role which its
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proponents hoped it would. In the context that meant that sport must be
barricaded from \mlgar commerce; there were also the more pressing
considerations that the sports and games which had developed
commercially...had been laced \\ith gambling and corruption and offered
what seemed extremely unfair competition to amateurs.(Allison, 5)
This attitude tow'ards amateurism would continue to manifest itself in British collegiate
sport, and it still exists today. Sports are viewed as a part of the greater whole; they
contribute to the development of the well-rounded individual. They are not forms of mass
entertainment, and the athletes who compete in them are not subsidized for their roles as
members of university sports teams(Sack & Staurowsky, 14). As vA\\ become clear, the
British amateur ideal is the direct opposite of w'hat has become the American amateur
ideal.
However, the modern-day American interpretation of amateurism in collegiate
athletics did not happen overnight. In reality, the original NCAA definition of
amateurism was closely in line with the British concept of amateurism. The NCAA
b>daw's required each member college or university to enforce rules and requirements that
promoted amateurism. These rules included one that stated that schools were prohibited
from “offering inducements to players to enter colleges or universities because of their
athletic abilities or supporting or maintaining players while students on account of their
athletic abilities, either by athletic organizations, indi\idual alumni, or other^dse, directly
or indirectly’'(Sack & Staurowsky. 33). The literal purpose of this rule was to keep
schools from offering any sort of payment to gifted athletes in the forms of athletic
scholarships or outright monetary compensation and perks. Ob\dously. the NC.AA (in
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1906) thought that it would be in the best interests of both the institutions and the
students in\ oh ed to keep athletics aligned v^ith the original British amateur ideal.
However, the early NCAA had veiy^ little real power. Member colleges and
universities were expected to comply with and enforce the NCAA's rules and regulations
individually. Because of the reasons outlined earlier in this paper, schools were loath to
return their athletic programs back to obscurity. Huge profits, national publicity^ and even
survival w^ere sometimes at stake in the arena of collegiate competition. Therefore, rule
transgressions and cheating ran rampant. College sports were already immensely popular.
so no one w'anted to see them decline into less than what they had become. School
presidents, alumni, boosters, students, and fans continued to carry on the practices they
had before the NCAA's ban on athletic compensation. Slush funds were set up. and a
fairly open system of paying players for their services w'as established by the early 1920s
(Sack & Staurow'sky. 34-39).
By the 1940s, many schools, particularly in the South, dismissed the NCAA's
rules on athletic subsidization outright and began offering athletic scholarships. On the
other hand, many northern and Midwestern schools attempted to comply with the
NCAA's rules, and the l\y League even moved away from placing an emphasis on
athletics by condemning the commercialization of college sport. This predicament, which
created a scenario whereby the NCAA practically did not exist, led the NCAA to move to
establish more concrete and feasible rules regarding the distribution of funds to athletes
and college sports teams(Sack & Staurow^sky, 43). The events that transpired next led to
the legislation of hypocrisy into the NCAA's agenda, and these events created the
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underpinnings of the moral and legal dilemmas that exist for college athletes and the
NCA.*\.
//.// The ^'Sanity Code, the Student-Athlete, and Ambiguous Amateurism
If the NCA.A. was going to remain a player in the world of collegiate athletics, it
needed to re\dse its rules governing how schools could compensate their athletes. The
scandals and blatant disregard for NCAA rules by many institutions, coupled with the
embarrassment of semi-professional athletic teams in American higher education,
prompted the NC.AA to institute the '“Sanity Code.’' The Sanity Code provided a way for
the NCA.\ to reconcile the economic and moral demands of its diverse member
institutions while maintaining a pretense of amateurism. Some schools, particularly in the
South, had been providing full scholarships for over a decade and did not want to
relinquish their ability’ to do so. Other schools, headlined by the old guard institutions of
Yale. Harv’ard. and Princeton, wanted there to be no difference between athletic students
and regular students. Therefore, the Sanity Code attempted to reconcile these differences
through the following provisions:
●

Financial aid could be awarded based on athletic prowess, but only if the
prospective student demonstrated a bona-fide financial need. This aid could only
cover tuition and incidentals.

●

Institutions could not withdraw athletic financial aid from a student if the student
decided to not participate in athletics.

Because universities could not deny an athlete financial aid if he (at the time, the NC.AA.
only covered men's sports) decided to not participate in athletics, athletic participation
was not a condition of his scholarship, although it was the original reason the scholarship
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was awarded. Therefore, the NCAA was able to avoid the sticky legal issue that could
have arisen if athletic participation was construed as a term of emplo\Tnent. whereby the
universities could have terminated the employment of students who refused to participate
in athletics. This situation would have clearly constituted professionalism, which is
something the NC.AA. desperately wanted to avoid (Sack & Staurowsky, 9-10).
Howe\'er. the Sanity Code forever changed the concept of amateurism in
collegiate .American sports. The sanctioning of subsidizations and compensation to
college athletes was in direct opposition to the NCAA's 1906 policy to condemn the
■'offering [of] inducements to players to enter colleges or universities because of their
athletic abilities or supporting or maintaining players while students on accotmt of their
athletic abilities, either by athletic organizations, individual alumni, or otherwise, directly
or indirectly." The British ideal of amateurism in America was officially dead.
Predictably, the Sanity Code did not last long. Several Southern colleges and
universities, including the University of Virginia, Virginia Tech, VMI, and the Citadel
refused to enforce its provisions. Therefore, when the required two-thirds majority of
other NCAA member institutions voted to not expel these delinquent universities, the
Sanity Code died right along with amateurism (Sack & Staurowsky,). However, the first
NCAA enforcement committees were created along with the Sanity Code, and these
committees sur\dve to the present and act as the teeth of the NCAA. The NCAA's
enforcement committees have the authority to freely investigate any school suspected of
wrongdoing and hand out fines and punishments as they see fit (Eckard).
In 1956. the NCAA created the precursor to the modem athletic scholarship. This
athletic scholarship was similar to the one created in the Sanity Code, except that it
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eliminated the need for financial aid on the part of the prospective athlete. It also had a
strict interpretation on what expenses could be covered by the scholarship: tuition and
fees, room and board, and books.
Ob\’iously. these scholarships, which are officially called “grants-in-aid by the
NC.AA. fly in the face of the basic tenants of amateurism. So why does the NCAA
continue to call college athletes amateurs? The NCAA undoubtedly created this false
definition of amateurism in order to surxdve. Without amateur athletes to monitor, the
NCAA would have no purpose. Furthermore, if athletes were no longer considered
amateurs, but rather employees, member institutions and the NCAA could be subject to
huge monetar>’ legal settlements resulting from workmen's compensation claims.
Therefore, the NCA.A embarked on a massive campaign to hide the fact that college
athletes were no longer amateurs (Sack & Staurowsky, 48). As Duderstadt says,
‘‘Although the NCAA portrayed itself as the defender of the integrity of college sports, in
reality this was primarily a public relations effort, aimed at deflecting criticism rather
than exploring more fundamental reforms"(Duderstadt, 118). It created the term studentathlete to refer to college athletes, which gives the impression that college athletes"
orientation is to study first, play second. It is also very particular about calling teams
‘‘teams"' instead of clubs, as “clubs’" has a professional ring to it. Walter Byers, the
longtime president of the NCAA who oversaw the creation ofthe athletic grant-in-aid,
succinctly reinforces this point when he says:
We crafted the term student-athlete, and soon it was embedded in all
NC.AA rules and interpretations as a mandated substitute for such words
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as pla\^ers and athletes. W'e told college publicists to speak oP'college
teams/' not football or basketball “clubs/' a word common to the pros.
(Byers. 69)
By showing the misleading intent behind the term '‘student-athlete," this quote shows the
blatant hypocrisy that has been legislated into the NCAA's rulebook in the pursuit of selfinterest. and it shows how far the NCAA wll go to mislead and misinform the public.
The term “student-athlete" has been con^incingly misleading. As stated before,
the term implies that college athletes come to schools to pursue their academic goals, and
that the}- engage in recreational athletics in their free time. However, in a recent study
published by the NC.AA that involved the responses of more than 21,000 college athletes
from more than 600 Di^'ision I. Division II. and Division III schools, Division I-A
football players reported that they devoted almost forty-five hours a week to football.
UTien comprehending this fact, keep in mind that the forty-hour workweek is the
standard used in federal compensation laws, and that NCAA rules state that coaches can
not demand more than twenty hours of their athletes' time for official team functions.
After football, men's baseball players reported spending forty hours on baseball, and
men's basketball players responded that they spent nearly thirty-seven hours on teamrelated activities. Meanwhile, participants in all three sports reported spending less
average time on their academics than on their sports (Wieberg). Nothing about these
statistics suggests that these college athletes are students first and athletes second.
Although the NC.AA rules do not allow for more than twenty hours of official practice
time each week, there is an implied pressure for athletes to spend more than twenty hours
a week on their sport through voluntary workouts, film study, drills, etc(Huma).
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Furthermore, beginning in 1973. the NCA^ made grants-in-aid annually renewable at a
coach's discretion. This means that grants-in-aid essentially serx^e as one-year contracts.
If an athlete does not perform as expected on the athletic field the coach can choose to
not extend his/her scholarship for another year. This development lent further credence to
the idea that athletes truly were athletes first and students second (Griffin. 42).
Lastly, games and matches are scheduled at times that are not conducive to
maintaining scholarship. College basketball teams routinely fly hundreds of miles to play
games on Tuesda>\ \\’ednesdax'. and Thursday nights and then fly back the same night.
Oftentimes, they arrive back in the early hours of the morning, and then they are expected
to get up and go to class the next day. Similarly, we increasingly see football played on
Thursday night, and. like basketball, teams oftentimes miss class to fly to faraway places
and play their “recreationaP games that are televised in front of hundreds of thousands of
people. In addition to presenting the false concept that athletes are students first and
foremost, the term “student-athlete’' and the NCAA's definition of amateurism serve
another, larger purpose: this NCAA legislation serves to keep the costs of production low
(by not compensating athletes) in the NCAA cartel of college athletic entertainment.
III. The NCAA Cartel
B\' serx'ing as the governing body ofthe collective entity that is collegiate sports,
the NC.A^ wields a substantial amount of influence, particularly financially. Although its
member institutions make all ofthe NCAA's decisions, its administrative body wields a
heax'y hand in the regulation and enforcement of its many rules regarding amateurism,
player compensation, and eligibility. Perhaps the most powerful of its functions is the
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NCAA's ability to legally (apparently) function as a cartel and limit the cost of the major
input into college sports, i.e. the college athletes (Eckard).
According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, cartels are “a combination of
independent commercial or industrial enterprises designed to limit competition or fix
prices"(Merriam-Webster). This definition applies to the NCAA and college athletes
almost as though Merriam-Webster had them in mind when it penned the words. Member
institutions, or the colleges and universities, are the independent commercial enterprises.
Each school maintains its owti independent brand, including a mascot, school colors, a
fight song, traditions, a unique stadium and game day activities, and legions of devoted
fans. Indi\ddual schools also seek to maximize revenues from their sports teams through
stadium gate receipts, concessions, licensed apparel, advertising, and corporate
sponsorship. Any arguments to the contrary that maintain that college sports are not
commercial are not tenable, as has been demonstrated earlier in this paper.
While the universities are the commercial enterprises, the NCAA is the glue that
binds them all together that is “designed to limit competition or fix prices.’' As stated by
Eckard:
The National Collegiate Athletic Association(NCAA)is the principal
regulator of intercollegiate athletics, including football. Its perhaps most
important and controversial activity involves enforced restrictions on
player recruiting, eligibility, and compensation. Because of these
regulations, many economists view the NCAA as a cartel through which
members ‘‘collude’' to exercise joint monopoly power over football’s main
input. Players are paid less than their marginal revenue products, and rents

37

generated b>- player talents are appropriated by institutions and their
athletic departments.(Eckard)
Through its enforcement of hundreds of pages of rules and regulations regarding
intercollegiate sport that are agreed upon by the NCAA's member institutions, the NCA.A
is able to monitor all of the colleges and universities in its domain to ensure that none of
them are violating the cartel agreement that exists to keep the cost ofinputs (players)
artificially lo\^\ Furthermore, the NCAA sets artificial, arbitrar}' standards for
membership in Division-IA by requiring that schools* stadiums have a minimum seating
capacity and an attendance average (Zimbalist, 150).
Although the courts have never decided negatively against the NCAA's
amateurism rules, the courts have found the NCA.A guilty of behaving as a cartel in the
past. Between 1951 and 1984. the NCA.A controlled the tele\ ision rights of all member
institution football teams. In other words, the NC.AA brokered the deals with the
tele\dsion networks, set the rules on which teams would play in the games, and the
NCAA distributed the revenues fi'om these televised games. However, revenues were not
distributed evenly. Large schools with good football teams got roughly the same amount
of television broadcast revenue as small teams with less desirable teams. Therefore, the
LIniversity of Oklahoma and the University of Georgia filed an antitrust suit against the
NCAA in the early 80s. After an appeal by the NCAA,the Supreme Court ruled that the
NCA.A was acting as a cartel because it was artificially limiting the number of games that
could be shovMi and engaging in price fixing (Zimbalist. 98-99). After this decision,
independent teams and individual conferences were able to set their own schedules and
negotiate their owm tele\ ision contracts, which they do with regularity. Despite this
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setback. hovv e\ er. the NC.\.\ continues to act as a cartel through the enforcement of its
amateurism rules and its regulations governing college sports. WTiile the aforementioned
Supreme Court decision reallocated the football revenues and gave them to the individual
schools and conferences, the NCAA continues to make hundreds of millions of dollars a
year through the NC.A.A-sanctioned sports tournaments, notably "March Madness, its
men's basketball championship.
So just exact!}- how much does the NCAA make, and how much money do the
schools make through their teams? And what do the players, the facilitators of this
machine knowm as big-time college athletics, really receive in return?
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Chapter 3: The Money
The undeniable fact of college sports is that the NCA.A., the athletic conferences.
and the schools bring in hundreds of millions of dollars a year. However, NCAA,
conference, and universit>- officials are quick to point out that ver\' few university athletic
departments actual!}' make money. In other words, while the football and men's
basketball teams at a large number of universities turn a profit and end up in the black,
the host of other, non revenue-producing sports sponsored by each university' siphon off
any profits and ultimately lead the athletic departments' budget into the red side ofthe
balance sheet. Additionally, the huge amounts of money thro^^^l at high-profile coaches,
stadium reno\'ations. and new facilities in pursuit ofthe "‘winning edge" drain any
revenues that university’ athletic departments may have made. These individuals, who
have a \'ested interest in maintaining the status quo in college sports, would have one
believe that the revenue-producing sports of football and men's basketball only exist to
support the non revenue-producing sports, like the men's tennis team, the women's swim
team, the volle}'ball team, and the softball team. According to these NCA.A, conference,
and university officials, the schools have no money to compensate their college athletes
in any real, tenable wa>’. Is this true? How much does the NCAA,the conferences, and
the schools make?
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I. The NCA.\
After the Uni\ ersit}’ of Oklahoma and the University of Georgia won their
antitrust lawsuit against the NC.AA. the association was deprived of its chief source of
revenue. Howe\'er. the NCA.A. still had bills to pay to maintain its facilities, pay its
administrators, and keep the organization afloat. Fortunately for the NCA.A., the meteoric
rise in popularity of college basketball provided it ^^dth another golden goose.
While college basketball has been only nominally popular and has often taken a
backseat to college football throughout much of its existence, its popularity, particularly
that of its national championship tournament, has exploded in the last twenty’-five years.
According to Zimbalist. **As tournament hours televised more than quintupled from the
late sixties to the mid-nineties, the television rights fees grew from $140,000 in 1966, to
$28.3 million in 1985. and to $166.2 million in 1995...'* (Zimbalist, 112). Studies have
shown that producti^’ity in the American workplace experiences a sharp decline during
the month of March while the NCA.A. tournament is being played; workers spend more
time filling out tournament brackets and discussing the highly-anticipated matchups.
Furthermore, the 2012 championship game between the University of Kentucky Wildcats
and the University of Kansas .layhawks drew 20.9 million viewers, which was a five
percent increase from 2011 (Hughes). This clearly shows how much more attention and
money came to be spent on men’s college basketball over a relatively short period of
time.
In fact, in 1990. the NCAA signed a behemoth contract worth one billion dollars
with CBS to broadcast the annual national championship tournament for seven years
(Zimbalist. 112). In 2010. the NC.A\ reached a fourteen-year deal with CBS and Turner
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Broadcasting to broadcast March Madness worth 10.8 billion dollars (O’Toole). These
media agreements represent roughly 85% of the NCAA’s revenues, with 86% of the
NCAA's 2009-10 re\ enues being generated from media rights(Where Does the Money
Go?). Figure 2 pro\ ides another example of both men’s college basketball’s continual
increase in popularity and the huge amounts of money made by the NCAA.
Figure 2: XCAJ March Madness Profits 2005-2013
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However, the NCAA does not just make money from the men’s basketball
tournament. In 2011, the NCAA renewed its previous contract with ESPN, signed in
2001, for five hundred million dollars. The deal will run thimigh 2023-2024 and will
allow ESPN to broadcast the NCAA championships of twenty-four sports, which is a
seven-sport increase from the previous deal. Viewers will now have access to more than
six hundred hours of annual live coverage, which will include men’s and women’s
fencing, Division-I men’s and women’s outdoor track, women’s bowling, Division-I
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women's lacrosse, and women's gymnastics(NC.\A. ESPN agree). Revenues from these
championships only accounts for approximately 15% of the NCAA's annual revenues.
and most of these re\’enues are generated from direct ticket sales(Where Does the Money
Go?).
While the NC.A.A annually generates huge amounts of money, it is important to
note that most of these rex enues are redistributed back to the indixddual athletic
conferences, notably those that field Division-I programs. In fact, 60% ofthe NCAA's
revenues for the 2009-10 fiscal year, which totaled more than $433 million, were
distributed to Dix ision-I programs. This money is divided up and gix^en to each
conference based on a formula that is mostly based on the conferences' long-term,
historical competitiveness, their dedication to athletic financial aid, and the amount of
sports that they sponsor. At that point, the conferences distribute the NCAA money to
their member institutions according to an agreed-upon, interleague formula(Where Does
the Money Go?).
The other 40% of NC.AA revenues directly supports the association's host of
championships, academic programs, employees' salaries, facilities maintenance, and
other administrative costs. Only 7.55% of the NCAA's revenues support its Division-II
and Division-Ill athletic programs. The NCAA is quick to point out that some of its funds
are set aside for academic programs, and it also maintains that 96% of its revenues
directly benefit its member institutions. According to the NCAA,this 96% is succinctly
allocated in the following way, as Figure 3 demonstrates (V^Tiere Does the Money Go?):
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Figure 3: NCAA Distributions
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On the surface, it seems as though the NCAA is doing a very noble thing by
distributing the greater part of its revenues back to its member institutions. However, one
must remember that the NCAA is run by these member institutions and serves as a cartel
by making sure that each member institution abides by the same rules and regulations.
Therefore, it makes sense that the NCAA member institutions (the individual colleges
and universities) would vote to distribute most of the NCAA’s revenue back to the
schools; why would they allow the NCAA,whom they have complete control over, to
keep hundreds of millions of dollars? Furthermore, it is interesting to note that while the
NCAA allegedly espouses a commitment to academics among the country’s “studentathletes,” it only distributes a miniscule amount of money to the Division-II and
Division-Ill schools. Divisions II and III most closely follow the principles of
amateurism, and Division-Ill does not even allow for the granting of scholarships based
on athletic merit.
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After seeing how much money is made by the NC.AA and then promptly
redistributed back to the conferences and schools, it is interesting to see what these
conferences and schools make individually in addition to their NCAA payouts.
II. The Conferences
As Kreher states, athletic conferences are collections of schools organized
together *lo pro\ ide a program of intercollegiate athletics for their teams." Traditionally,
conferences ha\'e been loosely structured on geographic grounds, but this is changing as
schools and conferences realign themselves in the never-ending pursuit of intercollegiate
athletic mone>'. After the aforementioned lawsuit filed by the University of Oklahoma
and the University of Georgia against the NCAA,each conference now negotiates its own
telextsion contract and controls the sx'stem of postseason bowl games for its college
football teams. Furthermore, conferences have the power to establish eligibility
requirements additional to those required by the NCAA,they organize their own
conference championships in the different sports fielded by their member schools, and
they assist the NCAA in policing its regulations (Kreher). Lastly, conferences make
money from three primary^ revenue streams: bowl games, NCAA tournaments, and
television deals (Smith).
For the purpose of remaining true to this paper's focus on “big-time" college
sports, there are eleven conferences and four independent universities (the University of
Notre Dame. Brigham Young University, the United States Naval Academy, and the
United States Military Academy)that compete in the NCAA's Division-IA. These
conferences are the Big 12. the Big 10. the Southeastern Conference (SEC),the Atlantic
Coast Conference (ACC),the Big East, the Pac-12, Conference USA,the Mid-American
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Conference(MAC),the Mountain West Conference (M\\^C). the Western Athletic
Conference(WAC). and the Sun Belt Conference. However, only six of these
conferences (the Big 10. Big 12. SEC. ACC. Big East, and Pac-12) consistently generate
large revenues, and these conferences all have lucrative television deals and often have
their members' games played on TV. The other five conferences, whose members are
schools such as the Idaho Vandals and the Massachusetts Minutemen, are not generally
part of the “elite" of college football. These conferences are usually on the outside
looking in when it comes to large conference revenues, and they struggle to get on
television consistently (Kreher).
College football in Di^'ision-IA is unique in that it does not have an official
national champion appointed through an NC.AA.-sanctioned national championship
tournament. Instead, the six large, revenue-generating conferences, w'hich are also called
'●automatic-qualifiers." participate in the Bowl Championship Series, or BCS. The BCS
guarantees each of the six “automatic-qualifiers" a spot in one of the four most lucrative
and prestigious bo\\1s. These bowls include the Rose Bowl, the Sugar Bowl, the Fiesta
Bowl, and the Orange Bowl. After the top bowl selections are handed out, the remaining
eligible schools are placed into a myriad of other bowls with which their conferences
have contracts (Kreher).
WTiile conferences do generate significant revenues from bowl games and NCAA
tournaments, the bulk of the major conferences' revenues come from their independently
negotiated TV deals. In fact. re\'enue from TV deals accounts for an a^'erage of nearly
80% of the five most profitable conferences revenue streams (Smith). Figures 4-9
illustrate the a\’erage annual re\’enues of the six highest earning conferences, which
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include the percentages of re\ enues from the three major revenue streams. Figure 10
illustrates the a\ erage annual re\ enue as a percentage of the three major revenue streams
of the next four highest earning conferences combined, which includes Conference USA,
the MAC. the MWC.and the WAC.
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Figures 4-10 clearly show which conferences are the major competitors in college
athletics,'fhe disparities in the percentages of revenue earned from television deals
between the Big Fast. Conference USA,the MWC,the MAC,the WAC,and the Big 10,
Pac-12. ACC. SEC. and Big 12 are noteworthy. The small conferences have small
television deals because networks want to put the more popular and more successful
programs of the big five conferences on television. TV networks would much rather
broadcast a game between the SEC's Tennessee Volunteers and Alabama Crimson Tide
than they would a game between the MWC's Colorado State Rams and Fresno State
Bulldogs. The Universities of Tennessee and Alabama each play in front of a hundred
thousand fans at home games. Colorado State and Fresno State play in front of
significantly less. Because of their small television deals, the smaller conferences have a
hard time remaining competitive with the lai'ger conferences. The overall revenue
differences between the large and small conferences are almost insurmountable; Figure
11 illustrates the identities of the “elites’" and the “also-rans.
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I'igurc II: D-IA average annual revenues by conference
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Conferences are similar to the NCAA. While they generate (in some cases)
hundreds of millions of dollars in revenues, the conferences redistribute much of the
wealth back to their member institutions. For instance, in the 2010-11 fiscal year, the
SEC distributed $220.0 million of its revenues back to the schools that make up the
Southeastern Conference. Each school received an average of $18.3 million (2010-11
SEC Revenue Distribution). Similarly, the Big 10 conference distributed $22.6 million to
each of its member institutions in the 2010-11 fiscal year (Big Ten Payouts).
Furthermore, athletic conference revenues are growing just as fast as the NCAA’s
March Madness revenues. When the SEC signed its television deals with ESPN and CBS
worth a combined $205 million to run from the 2009 season through 2023-24, the deals
were seen as landmark events in college sports history. However, four years later, the
SEC’s television deals net it only the fourth highest revenue among athletic conferences.
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as Figure 11 demonstrates. Recent deals by the Pac-12 and the ACC,along with the
popularit>- of the Big 10‘s Big Ten Netw'ork, have allowed those conferences to surpass
the SEC in ox erall revenue despite the fact that the SEC is widely viewed as the premiere
conference for college football(How High Can Rights Fees Go?). Teams representing the
SEC have won the BCS national championship game every year since 2006, and the
UniversiU' of Kentuck}-. an SEC member, w'on the college basketball championship at the
conclusion of the 2011-2012 season. The quality of the football in the SEC is further
demonstrated by the fact that it makes more money off bowi games than any other
conference, but bowi mone\' is not enough to close the gap with the three conferences
ahead of it. The meteoric trend of conference television deals will continue in the near
future. howeN^er. with the SEC expected to rework its current television deals after the
recent additions of Texas A&Ni Uni\'ersity and the University of Missouri, and there is
also speculation that the SEC could form its ver}' own network similar to the Big 10
network. These new' deals would undoubtedly make the SEC the most lucrative
conference in college sports, and they would pave the wny for other conferences to try
and procure even larger deals as the popularity of college sports continues to rise (Smith).
The analysis of conference financials leaves two more entities in the realm of
college sports to discuss: the schools and the players. As discussions ofthe NCAA and
the conferences have showm. the vast majority of the money those organizations bring in
gets distributed dowm to the individual colleges and universities. Therefore, how much
money do the schools* athletic departments make? Are they profitable, as many claim
they are not?
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III. The Schools
College and unixersity athletic departments do make tens, if not hundreds of
millions of dollars. However, do collegiate athletic departments actually make money?
Some, such as coaches, athletic directors, school presidents, and NC.AA officials, say no.
However, many others argue that college sports do make money. Those who claim that
collegiate sports do not make money concede that the football and men's basketball
programs at many universities do post positive profits. The caveat is that the host of
other. non-re\ enue producing sports sponsored by the university, coupled with stadium
renovations, seven-figure coaching salaries, and facility upgrades, ensure that many
athletic departments end up spending more than they make. Others disagree with this
reasoning, and these critics point to ambiguous accounting practices as a way for
collegiate athletic programs to hide their wealth. Zimbalist summarizes the critics' view
clearly when he says:
...These athletic programs are too embarrassed by their riches to come
clean. If they were to show their true net income, boosters would be loathe
to contribute, student fees would diminish, state legislatures would cut
subsidies, federal tax preferences would be curtailed, and fundraising
would be impaired. Pressure to pay the athletes would also increase.
Instead, the program accountants devise clever ways to hide their
profitability, including: shifting revenue to other university
departments...or counting grants-in-aid at their listed price rather than
actual cost. Further, since college athletic departments function in
nonprofit enxdronments...any surplus generated by sports programs is
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di\'ened to benefit administrators and coaches in the department via
abo\ e-market salaries, handsome perquisites, fancy office facilities, and so
on.(Zimbalist, 150)
These critics ha\'e \’alid points. Athletic programs realize that their missions are
distinctly out of s\mc with those of the schools they represent. Advertising huge profits
would undoubtedly direct negative attention at the commercial institution of college
sports. Also, the accounting procedures utilized by college athletic departments are
chimerical at best. There is no standard for reporting financial data in college sports, and
so athletic departments do have a significant amount of leeway when assigning revenues
and expenses (Zimbalist. 153)..Tames J. Duderstadt, a former president of the University
of Michigan, offers another interesting quote regarding the financial conundrum of
college sports:
WTiat is going on here? Could it be that those reporting about the
economics of college sports have difficulty understanding the B>^antine
financial statements of athletic departments? Are accounting tricks used to
hide the true costs of intercollegiate athletics? Or perhaps those who lead
and manage college sports have limited understanding of how financial
management and business accounting works in the first place?
It is probably all of the above, combined with the many other m>ths about
the financing of college sports, which confuse not only outsiders such as
the press and the public, but even those insiders such as the university
administration, athletic directors, and coaches.(Duderstadt, 126-127)
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Dudersladt presents some interesting questions about what makes the money behind
college sports so mercurial, but one simple fact remains: it is probably next to impossible
to discern \\^hether or not collegiate athletic departments ultimately actually make or lose
money.
However, w'hen considering the true value of an athletic program, it is important
to factor in indirect benefits. As discussed earlier in this paper, regardless of whether they
actually make money, college athletic programs can provide a host of indirect benefits to
a uni\'ersit\’ and its surrounding community. College athletics programs inspire some
alumni to give financial gifts to both the university and the athletic department
(Duderstadt. 129). T. Boone Pickens, the famous Oklahoma State University benefactor,
is a prime example. In 2003. Pickens gave Oklahoma State a $55 million dollar donation
to fund stadium renoN'ations (Lapchick. 47).
Furthermore, a successful collegiate athletic program can lead to a large increase
in student applications, which is a phenomenon that has been termed the “Flutie Factor."
In 1984. quarterback Doug Flutie of the Boston College Eagles beat the heavily favored
Michigan Wolverines on national television with a last-second, last-gasp Hail Mary pass.
After the big win. Boston College, which was relatively unknown in the sports world at
that point, experienced a dramatic rise in undergraduate applications. Thus, the increase
in student applications resulting from sports \'ictories came to be known as the “Flutie
Factor"(Sperber, 60-61). Similarly, the University of Florida received 21,710 student
applications in 2006. which is the year the Florida Gators won national titles in both
football and men's basketball. In 2007, student applications to the University of Florida
Jumped almost 1 l®'o. The success of the Florida Gators continued, as the men's basketball
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team won a second national title and quarterback Tim Tebow won a Heisman Trophy.
Not surprisingly, applications rose almost another 10%(Dosh).
More indirectly, college sports can benefit the university by benefitting the
university's communirv. Athletic events bring generations of alumni together, both past
and present, and generate goodwill tow’ards the university. College football hotspots, such
as The Grove in Oxford. Mississippi and College Station, Texas, are famous for ser\'ing
as gathering places for thousands offans, students, and alumni. In turn, these university
stakeholders pump millions of dollars into the local economies and stimulate gro'\\lli. It is
no coincidence that Oxford, Mississippi, the home of the University of Mississippi,
continues to grow and flourish despite being located in North Mississippi, which has a
tradition of economic stagnation. Similarly, a reputation for growth and progressivism
can help a university attract better faculty, which will benefit the university as a whole.
Unfortunately, these indirect benefits are difficult to measure. '\ATiat can be
measured is the financial data that schools report to the NCAA and to the United States
Department of Education. This data largely reflects the trends discussed earlier in this
paper. Football and men's basketball programs are generally shown to make money, but
the expenses of the other athletic teams at each school drain away their profits. A small
minority of the very largest programs report making a demonstrative profit from their
athletics programs. These large programs are followed by a host of‘‘middle-tier"
programs that make small profits, break even, or lose a small amount of money.
Subsequenth’. the small programs that constitute the smaller conferences report even
smaller profits. Table 2 demonstrates this trend.
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7able 2: D-IA Athletics Programs - Revenues & Expenses - 2011
School

Conference

Revenues(S)

Expenses(S)

Difference (S)

Top-Tier
Texas

Big 12

150.295.926

133.686.815

16.609.111

Ohio State

Bia 10

131.815,821

122,286,869

9,528,952

Alabama

SEC

124.498.616

105,068,152

19,430,464

Penn State

Bia 10

116.118.025

101,336,483

14,781,542

Oregon

Pac-12

85,819,699

76,274,142

9,545,557

Middle-Tier
Arizona

Pac-12

59,663.128

58,506,308

1,156,820

Texas Tech

Big 12

59,534,895

56,970,651

2,564,244

Georgia Tech

ACC

54,354,409

55,065,262

(710,853)

Ole Miss

SEC

49,180,892

47,109,301

2,071,591

lovva State

Big 12

48,591,617

48,469,929

121.688

Bottom-Tier
Miami(OH)

MAC

26,745,727

26,975,567

(229,840)

UAB

C-USA

25,690,048

25,224,426

465,622

FIU

Sun Belt

23,849,954

24,606,141

(756,187)

Nevada

WAC

22,652,490

23,112,105

(459,615)

WKU

Sun Belt

22,269,484

22,269,484

0

Source: USA Today
http;//usatoday30.iisatoday.com/sports/college/story/2012-05-14/ncaa-college-athletics-financesdatabase/54955804/1

The numbers shown in Table 2 include all sources of revenue and expenses for a
collegiate athletic program. Revenues include ticket sales, student fees, school funds.
contributions, rights/licensing, as well as the aforementioned NCAA and conference
distributions. Expenses include scholarships, salaries, facilities and grounds maintenance.
and the myriad other expenditures of a collegiate athletic program. Other expenses
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constitute tra\ el expenditures, recruiting, equipment, unifomis, insurance, etc(USA
Today).
As expected, schools that belong to the top conferences dominate the top and
middle tiers. While the \ ery top schools reported making money off ot their athletics
programs, the middle and bottom tiers reported negligible profits. Some bottom tier
schools even reported losses. However, while Table 2 shows the overall revenues and
expenses of a sample of collegiate athletic departments, it does not show the revenues
and expenses of the indi\ idual teams that the athletic departments sponsor. Figure 12
illustrates the discrepancies between the profits of football and men's basketball and the
expenses of the other, non-revenue producing sports.
Figure 12: Football & men's basketball revenues contrasted with other program
expenses
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Figure 12 demonstrates a large degree of validit}' for the argument that an athletic
department's non-revenue producing sports drain away any profits produced by football
and men's basketball. As the figure shows, expenses counteract profits at all but the
largest schools. Schools such as .Arizona and UAB lose so much money on the non
revenue producing sports that they ultimately end up with a net loss from the operations
of their athletic departments, while Ole Miss's financial reports show'the school just
managing to break even.
While athletic departments function like corporations, very few ofthem function
like successful corporations. As demonstrated, the sports that do not post positive profits,
such as softball, women's basketball, tennis, and soccer, drain away all the profits that
athletic departments derive from football and men's basketball. In the car manufactunng
industr>^ this w'ould be analogous to producing two models of car that consumers actually
bu\’ in order to keep producing ten models that consumers do not buy. Also, the schools
that do make profits generally spend everything they make on facility upgrades and
coaching salaries. As discussed previously, they have to spend everything they make in
order to maintain a winning edge: the best players will not play for a program that does
not have good facilities and a recognizable coach. If the program does not get the best
players, it generally will not win consistently, which will lead to less growth and fewer
profits.
Therefore, without further proof, it appears that the \’ast majority' of college
athletic departments are not overly profitable. Wdiile the disconnection between
university’ and athletic depairtment missions and the lack of universal accounting
principles are noteworthy, they are unlikely to be responsible for overturning the
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e\-idence presented abo\ e. The trends in the finances of collegiate athletic departments
are too strong to be the product of a conspiracy to hide the true nature of college sports.
Big schools with the best athletic departments make the most money,the average
programs general!}- hover around the break-even point, and the small programs either
make small profits or lose money.
Schools must be in the sports entertainment business for the indirect benefits they
receix'e. Rather than putting a premium on making money from the games themselves,
the schools profit in other wa\'s through increased student applications, greater university
goodwill, community growth, and so forth. So what is left over for the players? After all,
one hundred thousand people do not pack into the University of Tennessee's Neyland
Stadium to watch the coaches coach or the athletic directors direct. The fans come to
watch the players. It stands to reason, then, that the players should get something in
return for their sendees.
IV. The Players
The most obvious benefit players receive is their athletic scholarship, or grant-inaid. In exchange for their athletic talents, colleges give players the opportunity for a free
education and pay for their room, board, and books. Apart from the grant-in-aid,
however, players encounter several other unique costs and benefits of being “studentathletes."
7K7Benefits
In addition to their full athletic scholarship, student-athletes (if they qualify) are
eligible for Pell Grants. A Pell Grant is a college scholarship given to low-income
students b> the federal government. If the student-athletes qualify, they can keep this
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mone\- lo help offset the costs of attending college. Since 1997,the NCAA has also
allowed students to work a job during the academic year. However, as discussed earlier,
college athletes report spending approximately forty hours per week on their sport. The
fort> -hour workweek is the standard used in federal compensation laws, so it is unlikely
that man\- students take ad^’antage of their ability to get a job in addition to the time they
devote to their sport and their schoolwork ever)' week (Zimbalist, 43).
College athletes are also the beneficiaries of special academic tutoring. Ever)'
Division-I.A athletic department runs some sort of academic assistance program, and as of
2006. the NC.AA estimated that its Division-IA members spent approximately $150
million annuall)' on academic assistance. In 2013. that figure is bound to be much higher.
Many athletic departments look at special academic programs as another w’ay to maintain
the winning edge. Schools such as Louisiana State University' and the University' of
Georgia ha^'e built multi-million dollar facilities to house their academic support centers,
and Georgia annually spends almost as much on tutoring for its athletes as it does on the
actual student body of more than 25.000 students (Thamel). These special academic
centers seem to be working. Nationally, male college football players graduate at a higher
rate than male non-athletes (Beahm). While it seems admirable that athletic departments
invest so much money on their athletes' academic well-being, one can reasonably assume
that some of the expenditures are motivated by a desire to keep the athletes academically
eligible to play sports with the NC.AA.
In addition to special academic support centers, college athletes often live in
special housing as well. WTiile it is not allowed for universities to maintain exclusive
"athletes-only" housing, schools can build plush campus living spaces so long as 50%
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plus one of ihe occupants are not athletes. Therefore, team graduate assistants, coaches,
and others can li\ e in the housing with the athletes. Fancy special housing has also
emerged as a recruiting tool for athletic departments (Zimbalist, 44).
Grants-in-aid. Pell Grants, academic tutoring, and special housing are the main
benefits that college athletes derive from their status. Additionally, they can also gain
se\'eral other auxiliar>’ benefits. Valuable life skills and character can be taught on the
pla\’ing field. On the other side of the spectrum, college athletes are more likely to
recei\'e special benefits and side payments from boosters, fans, and alumni. These people
have no vested interest in observing NC.AA rules, and so college athletes can benefit
from these “improper” gifts, which can range from money to free TVs to ghost jobs that
do not actually require any work (Zimbalist. 45). However, college athletics come with
costs, too.
IKII Costs
While scholarship athletes do receive a free education as a result of their athletic
prowess, oftentimes this education is. in the words ofZimbalist, “diluted.” As previously
mentioned, many athletes spend more than forty hours a week on their sports, which
leaves little time for productive study. Although the athletes have huge academic support
centers behind them, there is evidence to suggest that these support centers exist more to
keep the players eligible than to actually help them gain a meaningful education
(Thamel).
Furthermore, games scheduled during the week keep college athletes out of class
for days at a time. The emphasis that schools place on athletics, especially in football and
men's basketball, makes it difficult for college athletes to put a premium on their
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educations. Da\ id Bennen. a former staff member at S>Tacuse University, emphasized
the lack of importance attached to a college education when he said,“There are
innumerable ‘guts* on e\'er>^ campus, some of them designed specifically for student
athletes. There are empty degrees, totally hollow degrees." Zimbalist reiterated this point
when he said:
"Even when students enroll in standard courses, the meaning of their grade
is often suspect. The athletics department can recommend professors who
are lenient to athletes, and in other cases where a student is in trouble there
are many big-time coaches who have called professors to ask for favors.
(Zimbalist. 39).
Thus, despite the fact that they graduate at higher rates than their non-athletic
peers, the value of a college athlete's education can be called into question. Examples
such as Dexter Manley and Alan Page lend credence to this idea. Manley, a former
professional football player, admitted to Congress that he is illiterate, while Page, who is
also a professional football player, stated that six out ofthe eight professional athletes in
a team meeting either had considerable difficulty in reading a playbook or could not read
a playbook at all (Zimbalist, 40).
Beyond the perceived value of the education college athletes receive, there is
another serious cost plaguing college sports, and it highlights the distinct issue facing
collegiate athletics toda>\ According to a study published jointly by the National College
Players Association(NCPA)and the Drexel University' Sport Management Program, the
shortfall between the value of a grant-in-aid and the true cost of attendance left college
players li\ ing below the federal poverty line at nearly 86% of Di\ ision-IA schools
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(Huma). This finding presents a stark contrast between the players and the hundreds of
millions of dollars the schools, conferences, and NCAA make annually.
¥

As we ha\ e seen, the athletic grant-in-aid sanctioned by the NCAA covers tuition.
fees, room and board, and books. However, it does not cover the full cost of attendance.
or the "amount calculated by an institutional financial aid office, using federal
regulations, that includes the total cost of tuition and fees, room and board, books and
supplies, transportation, and other expenses related to attendance at the institution.” This
shortfall can be significant. Annual out of pocket expenses to pay the costs of attendance
not covered by the grant-in-aid range from a little under $1,000 to over $6,000 depending
on the school, with a national average of $3,222(Huma). Therefore, unless an athlete's
family gives him/her mone>’. or if he/she receives excess funds from a Pell Grant,
e\'eryday acti\’ities can become daunting obstacles. Getting groceries, paying for gas.
going to see a mo\ ie. or traveling back home to see family represent significant
difficulties for some college athletes, especially for those who come from low-income
backgrounds. Many college athletes agree. In the words of Damone Jones, a former
football player at Penn State:
The most important issue for student-athletes is the ongoing saga of“pay
or not to pay.” Although they are student-athletes and admittedly choose
to participate in sports...they are still entitled to be able to earn enough
money for day-to-day expenses. For most athletes, that extra money comes
from a family that can afford to send their son...the money to get by.
However, there are a number of[student-athletes] who come from low-income areas and families w^ho can't afford to send extra money to school.
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Full scholarships don't pay for soap or toothpaste, or food after the dimng
hall is closed, or a callins card to sav hello to folks at home 400 miles
away.(Lapchick. 274)
Furthemiore. on a\ eraae. colleae athletes live $1,834 below the federal povertyline. In 2011. the year the study was published, the poverty guideline established by the
United States Department of Health and Human Ser\-ices for a single person was
$10.890. The study did not include the value of tuition, fees, or books in this figure
because they do not affect an athlete's ability to pay for necessities such as food.
clothing, and shelter. .\ sampling of ten large DiN'ision-LA. schools and the shortfalls
between their football players' grants-in-aid and the cost of attendance, as well as the
aN’erage amount that each schools' football players live below the poverty line for 200910. is included in Table 3 (Huma).
Table 3; Poverir & the cost ofattendance (COA)at D-IA schools

Sclaobl

Amount Below Poverty Line

Amount Below COA

Texas

-$778

-$3,624

.Alabama

-$684

-$2,475

Georgia

-$2,430

-$1,510

Pemi State

-$1,836

-$3,924

LSU

-$2,680

-$2,870

Florida

-$2,250

-$3,190

Auburn

-$1,260

-$2-510

Notre Dame

-$20

-$1,500

Ohio State

-$726

-$4,716

Michigan

-$1,698

-$2,090

Source: The Price of Povem in Big Time College Sport
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Meanw hile. nian>- football and men's basketball players have fair market values
(FMV)estimated to be in the hundreds of thousands of dollars. W^ile there is no definite
wa>' to calculate the \ alue of a college athlete, the NCPA and Drexel University study
used the current collecti\ e bargaining agreements(CBA)for the National Football
Association (NFL)and National Basketball Association(NBA)to calculate a value for a
college athlete. The NFL's CBA guarantees its players 46.5% of all revenues. In 2011,
the NBA was in the process of negotiating a new CBA with its players, so the study used
the NBA ow ners' stated desire for a 50/50 revenue split to calculate the fair market value
for college men's basketball players.
In a deregulated, free market emironment. the college football players with the
highest fair market \ alue belonged to the University of Texas Longhorns, w^hose players
W'-ere worth an a\ erage of almost $514,000. In men's basketball, Duke University’players
would command a fair market ^’alue of over one million dollars(Huma). Tables 4 and 5
illustrate the fair market values for the top ten schools for both football and men's
basketball players.

64

Table 4: lop I(> Too!hall bM]'s
School

Table 5: Top 10 Men's Basketball FKTl's
Sciioo]

FMV ($)

FMV{$)
Jl

XL

Texas

513.922

Duke

1.025.656

-A,labama

393.251

Louisville

995.769

Georuia

387.528

North Carolina

790.430

Penn Slate

384.082

.Arizona

741.732

LSU

376.482

S\Tacuse

704.210

Florida

375.916

A\usconsin

679,474

.-Auburn

361.949

Kentucky

645.432

Notre Dame

351.010

Indiana

637.314

Ohio State

348.750

Ohio State

622.720

Ndichigan

345.683

Michigan State

620.699

Source: The Price of Povert> in Big Time
College Sport

Source: T'he Price of Poverty in Big Time
College Sport

These numbers represent a significatit. indirect cost for college football and men's
basketball pla\ ers. While their roles as collegiate athletes could potentially cam them
hundreds of thousands of dollars in a free market, many athletes actually live in poverty
and struggle to pa>- for everyday expenses. Therein lies the most formidable ethical
dilemma facing college spoils: \^■hile athletes do receive a "free" education, many still
cannot adequateh' cover the cost of attendance but generate hundreds of thousands of
dollars for their schools. Under current NCA.A rules, college athletes cannot be paid
beyond the \ alue of their grants-in-aid. So is there a better way to compensate those
athletes w'ho generate re\’enues for their .schools? Part 4 proN’ides recommendations on
how to more fairh reform the cument s\’stem of compensation for collegiate athletes.
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Chapter 4: Recommendations
Nearl\ e\ en one who has e\ cr watched a collegiate sporting event has an opinion
on ho^^ athletes could best be compensated for what they do for their universities. These
opinions range all across the spectrum of feasibilit}'. and some, on the surface, seem
better than others. There is no "riuht way" to reform college sports. However, we can
prox'ide recommendations on alternatives or options that could be tenable and
accomplishable. Chapter 4 will outline some of the different perspectives on howto
reform college athletics, and these opinions range from professionalizing college sports to
maintaining the status quo. After lookins at some of the available options, this paper will
proN'ide recommendations for how college sports could best be made more fair and
equitable to the athletes v^ho make it happen.
I. Pay-for-Play
The reasons for a pa> -for-play s\'stem. in wWch universities pay their players a
wage or salar>. are diverse. Some believe that it makes good economic sense to pay
college athletes, while some maintain that it is ethical to pay them. Still others think that a
pa> -for-play system would cut do^^Tl on the scandals that plague college sport, in which
athletes accept illegal pa>’ments from boosters or sell memorabilia.
Rodney D. Fort, a professor of economics at Washington State University,
believes that pa\ ing college athletes makes economic sense. According to Fort:
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Man> people ha\ e an aversion to paying college athletes for their services,
but an examination of various principles of economics show that paying
athletes makes sense and would make the college sports system more
efficient in the wav it distributes monev. Plavers would receive more of
the revenues they produce while pay would be cut for administrators and
other emplov ees in athletic departments.(Griffin. 10)
In Fort's opinion, competition should dictate where players go. and the NC4A,along
with its amateur requirements, should be disbanded. Fort maintains that the money for
paying players is readily available: it just gets spent on other all the other things this
paper has alread> outlined and discussed. Stadium renovations, facility upgrades, and
coaching and administrativ'e salaries eat up the players' marginal revenue product.
Furthenmore. he maintains that the richest schools buv ing the best players will not upend
the competitiv'e balance of collece sports. After all, the wealthiest athletic departments
already dominate college football recruiting (Griffin, 10-13).
Brian Porto, an attorney who contributes to the Journal ofSport and Social
Issues, thinks that pac ing college athletes will help to reduce the number of scandals and
social issues surrounding college sport, such as the recent controversy over Ohio State
football players receiving improper benefits from a tattoo parlor. In his eyes, the
universities unfairly exploit college athletes, which leaves them no choice but to try and
make money elsewhere. In Porto's words:
College athletes are exploited by the universities they represent.... The
athletes can see that everyone else is making money but they are not
allowed to have any. This gives them incentives to accept illegal payments
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from boosters and agents or to enter into deals with gamblers to affect the
outcome of games for betting purposes.(Griffin, 41).
●loe Nocera. a columnist for The Xew York Times, also thinks that players are
exploited b\ the commercial enterprise of collegiate sport. He remarks on the huge
lele\'ision contracts siuned b\ the NC.A.A. the conferences, and some indi\idual schools.
He also comments on the huge salaries paid to coaches when contrasting what eveiy^one
in the system but the players makes:
The h\'pocris>‘ that permeates big-money college sports takes your breath
awa>-. College football and men‘s basketball have become such huge
commercial enterprises that together they generate more than $6 billion in
annual revenue

.A> top college coach can make as much or more than a

professional coach: Ohio State just agreed to pay Urban Meyer $24
million over six vears. Pow'erful conferences like the S.E.C. and the Pac
12 have signed lucrative TV deals, while the Big 10 and the University of
Texas have created their own sports networks. Last year, Turner
Broadcasting and CBS signed a 14-year. $10.8 billion deal for the
iele\'ision rights to the N.C.A.A.'s men's basketball national
championship tournament (aka '‘March Madness”). And what does the
labor force that makes it possible for coaches to earn millions, and causes
marketers to spend billions, get? Nothing. The workers are supposed to be
content with a scholarship that does not even cover the full cost of
attending college. .Any student athlete who accepts an unapproved, free
hamburger from a coach, or even a fan. is in violation of N.C.A..A.. rules.
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(Nocera)
Other pa> -for-pla> ad\ ocaies approach pay-for-play from another angle: these
proponents w ant to see the NCAA allow college athletes to pursue 01\Tnpic-style
endorsement deals, in which the players are not paid to compete in their sports, but
instead are free to pursue commercial activities externally. The authors oftheNCPAand
Drexel Uni\ crsit> stud> are proponents of this option. In their eyes, the freedom to
pursue external endorsements v\all force the NC.AA. to admit that its concept of
amateurism is a falsehood, and the deregulation of college athletes' ability to accept
pa\’ments from outside sources will also cause the number ofrules infractions to
significantly decrease. The study recommends that:
Lift restrictions on all college athletes' commercial opportunities by
adopting the Oh mpic amateur model. The Olympics international
definition of amateurism permits amateur athletes access to the
commercial free market. They are free to secure endorsement deals, get
paid for signing autographs, etc. The NCAA s version of amateurism is
impractical and is an unjust financial arrangement imposed upon college
athletes. The NCAA's attempt to eliminate the commercial free market
creates a black market in which universities, coaches, agents, financial
ad\’isors. runner, and players will continuously violate the rules.(Huma)
All of the options and reasons for paying players presented above make sense, and
each particular \ iewpoint presents e\'idence to back up its claims. However,there are
those who do not think that colleges should adopt a pay-for-play system.
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II. Maintain the Status Quo
\\ hile some people ad\ ocate for a pay-for-play system for college athletes, still
others insist that pa\ -for-play is either not necessar}' or not feasible. Critics of apay-forpla\ s\'stem generally disagree \\ith it for two main reasons: athletes are compensated
with the \ alue of an education, and pay-for-play systems would be immensely difficult to
implement and control.
Critics of the pay-for-pla>’ s>'stem argue that the value of an education is far
greater than an\’ pa> ments or stipends that players could receive as college athletes.
Depending on the institution, the \’alue of a college education may be worth hundreds of
thousands of dollars, and studies show that those with college degrees make substantially
more mone\' over their lifetimes than those without college degrees. Additionally, college
athletes recei\ e another form of education. College athletes receive superior coaching and
training, and some are afforded the opportunity to pursue a professional career in their
sport (.lohnson).
Furthermore, others think that a pay-for-play system would create more problems
than it solves. As Johnson says:
Despite the well-documented scandals and comiption in college athletics,
many would probably agree that pa\ing athletes would exponentially
increase the need for intense NC.AA oversight — an enomtous task by all
accounts. Plus, there are the practical issues to consider. For example, how
much should the athletes get paid and will paAanents be based on
performance? Vk'hat if the athlete gets hui1? U^at if the athlete is a bust
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anJ jespii reinaipang on the team, doesn't start or even play at ail? Issues iltat seem to raise far more questions than answers.(Johnson)
Also, it w ould be a logistical nightmare to figure out which athletes would get
paid and how much thc> w ould be paid. If schools paid the football and men's basketball
players, the> would undoubted!)- have to pay all of the college athletes at the school
because of federal Title IX pro\ isions (Johnson). Athletic department profitability would
also be called into question if schools were forced to pay players. As shown earlier in this
paper. man\- athletic departments purportedly do not post substantial profits from their
operations. Thus. v\ here would the money to pay players come from?
Despite the differing \'iewpoints on the state of college sport and its players, there
is no clear-cut answer for how to fix college sport's problems. Therefore, the next section
wall pro\ ide a list of recommendations for how this paper thinks college sport could be
made more fair and equitable for the players while also understanding that the institution
of commercial collegiate athletics is here to stay.
III. Recommendations
For better or for worse, collegiate sports as we know them are here to stay. The
NCAA,the conferences, and the individual schools that sponsor college sports teams
have too much invested in the enterprise to change it in a way that would affect their
profitability. These institutions have decided that the good (the money and increased
visibility )from commercial college athletics outweighs the bad (the unusual, unfair
predicament of college athletes). The unique, century -old marriage of commercial
collegiate sports and American higher education does not show any signs of changing.
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Ho\^'e^■er. ihere are r\\ o major reforms that have the potential to reduce the inequities that
exist between the collegiate athletic departments and the players.
First, the

should adopt legislation that requires schools to provide players

with stipends that fully co\'er the cost of attendance at each university. The financial aid
offices at indi\ idual universities publish figures for the true cost of attendance at that
particular school, and. as discussed previously, the average annual shortfall between the
value of an athlete's scholarship and the cost of attendance is approximately $3,220.
Vv'hile athletic depanments would undoubtedly complain that they could not afford to pay
for this stipend, the money to cover this increased cost exists within the athletic
departments; it just gets spent on other things. In the never-ending quest to fi eld a
u’inning sports teams, many athletic departments spend everything they make on
coaching and administrati\ e salaries, facility’ upgrades, stadium renovations, and the like.
I'herefore. athletic departments should redirect some of those funds to pay for the cost of
attendance stipends without harming the overall athletic budget. For instance, the
scholarship shortfall for the entire University' of Texas football team in 2009-10 was
$308,040. That same year, coach Mack Bro’s^n made $5,161,500 (Huma). By taking the
funds needed to cover the cost of attendance at the University of Texas from Coach
Brown's salary, the quality' of life of the players would increase dramatically, while
Brown's standard of living would not be unduly affected. Similarly, the scholarship
shortfall for the University' of Louisville's men's basketball was $57,330 for the 2009-10
fiscal year, while coach Rick Pitino's salaiy was $4,073,093. The cost of attendance
stipend could very easily be taken out of Coach Pitino's salary without even denting his
overall compensation.
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In lact. some coaches support this kind of change. University of South Carolina
head football coach Ste\ e Spurrier recently introduced a proposal at the 2011 SEC spring
meeting to pa\ pla> ers $300 per game, even if he had to pay it out of his o^^^l pocket.
Coach Spurrier made his position clear when he said:
1 presented a proposal that we give our football players S300 a game for
game expense that the>- could give it to their parents for travel, lodging,
meals. Ma> be the\- could take their girlfriend out Sunday night or
Saturda) night and so forth. .A. bunch of us coaches felt so strongly about it
that w e would be willing to pay it -- 70 guys, 300 bucks a game. That's
onl>- $21.000 a game. 1 doubt it will get passed, but as coaches in tlie SEC,
w^e make all the mone>’. as do universities, television, and w^e need to get
more to our players. That was just something that we need to get out there.
Seven of the coaches said they w’ould be willing to pay it. (.Tones)
Alabama's Nick Saban. Florida's Will Muschamp, LSU's Les Miles, Mississippi State's
Dan Mullen, former Tennessee coach Derek Dooley, and former Mississippi coach
Houston Nun also signed his proposal.
Second, college athletes should be allowed to pursue external endorsements. The
NC.AA should admit that its definition of amateurism is broken and hypocritical because
it already allows schools to pay their athletes with scholarships. This arrangement would
not cost the commercial collegiate sports enterprise an>lhing; it does not require
universities to pay their athletes, but it will allow them to get paid.
Furthermore, virtually all other .Americans are allowed to capitalize on their fame
or notoriet>'. so wiiy not college athletes? Wlien Brooke Shields was a student at
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Princeton, it was well within her rights to earn a million dollars for a movie role
(Zimbalist. 1 7). College athletes, who are also university students, cannot. College sports
stars, such as Cam Ne\Mon and Andrew Luck, have the potential to be some ofthe most
recognized people in the United States. Current Texas A&M quarterback Johnny Manziel
is a prime example of why college athletes should be allowed to pursue external
endorsement deals. Manziel took the college football world by storm during the 2012
season. He led the Texas .A&.M Aggies to ten wins, including a victor}’ over eventual
national champion Alabama, led the nation in total offense per game, and won the
Heisman Troph}'. However, under current NCAA rules, he is not allowed to accept any
sort of benefit as a result of his fame and popularity. Current NCAA president Mark
Emmert explains the NC.AA's rationale behind why Manziel is not allowed to capitalize
on his fame.
The position of the NCAA has always been that when a student is playing
for their university’, they ai’e getting the full advantage of being part of that
university. They are able to build on that popularity, and when they go
pro. they’ are extraordinarily well-positioned to monetize their brand..And
why will Johnny Manziel be able to do that? Because he played at Texas
A&M and was successful and perhaps won the Heisman.(Rovell)
It appears as though Emmert assumes that all college athletes go on to play
professionally, and that they do not warrant any outside endorsement because the schools
are preparing them to play’ professional sports. Of course, this logic is. in the spirit of the
NCAA,flawed. Only’ a tiny percent of college athletes go on to play professional sports,
and of that small percent, only a few’ have long careers. In tlie case of Johnny Manziel
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Emmcrt is also assuming that when Manziel is eligible for the NFL draft, he will emerge
from Texas A&M wiih the same wa^‘e of momentum that he currently enjoys. How^e\'er,
Manziel could poieniialh- suffer a de\ astating injtiry that leaves him unable to play
football. His level of performance could also fall off. which could scare away NFL
scouts. I'herefore. Manziel. and all other college athletes, should be allowed to capitalize
on their brand and popularit\- while they have the opportunity.
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Closing
The commercial collegiate sports complex is large and complicated. Billions of
dollars flow through the o\ erall enterprise each year, with the NCA.A., the conferences,
and the indi\ idual schools receix ing vast amounts of both direct and indirect benefits.
Howexer. the money does not always make it to the bottom ofthe collegiate empire,
which is xx here the players reside. UTiile the players generate the money,they see very
little of it in return.
B>- discussing the history of collegiate sport in America, this paper has
demonstrated hoxx’ deeplx' and thoroughly ingrained in .American culture college athletics
are. For many people, college sports are a xvay of life. This paper has also demonstrated
why American higher education is unique in its sponsorship of commercial sports
entities, and it shows which American colleges and universities are the real players in the
world of college athletics.
The unique position and function of college sport s governing body, the NCAA,
has also been discussed. By serving as a cartel for American colleges and unix^ersities, the
NC.AA has been able to effectively mislead the American public on the concept of
'“student-athlete'" amateurism for over sixty years. Furthermore, the NCAA has also been
allowed to artificially limit the costs of college sports through its amateurism code.
Next, the huge sums of money that are collected by the NC.AA. the athletic
conferences, and the indix’idual schools are highlighted. \Miile the NC.AA and the
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conferences each make hundreds of millions of dollars, much of their revenues are
redistributed back to their member institutions. However, ver>* few collegiate athletic
departments post profits because of the expenses of the host of"‘non-revenue” sports that
each school sponsors. Furthermore, the schools generally spend any profits they do make
on coaching and administrati\ e salaries, facility upgrades, and stadium renovations.
Lasth. man>- people think that college athletes are being exploited and should be
paid to pla>-. \\ hile man>- others think that factors such as a scholarship and an education
constitute adequate compensation. Despite these differing vie’wpoints, there is something
inherenth- wrong with the way college athletes are compensated. They serve as the
catalysts behind the machine that is college sports, but they are unfairly restricted in their
pursuit of economic gains by outside institutions, notably the NCAA,and many athletes
even li\'e in po\ert>’. Howe\er. the institution of college sport is thoroughly entrenched in
.American culture, and a pay-for-play system, in which athletes receive salaries or a wage,
would probabh’ ne\’er be full}' embraced. Therefore, a stipend to cover the difference that
exists between the \'alue of a scholarship and the true cost of attending a particular
institution should be funded by athletic departments and afforded to every college athlete.
The money to fund such a stipend already exists in the athletic departments; it is just
spent on other things. Furthermore, college athletes should be allowed to pursue external
endorsements and profit off of their own fame and image.
By implementing these two recommendations for reform, the relationship
between college sports and college athletes could be made much more respectable and
transparent. Cost of attendance stipends would not affect the overall athletic budget in a
serious wa>. while allowing athletes to pursue endorsements would not cost the
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enterprise an>ihing. In short, these recommendations can create a more fair and equitable
system for college athletics: a level playing field.
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